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ABSTRACT

Even though many countries still permit husbands to rape
their wives with little or no consequence, there is a growing
trend that marital exemption is unjust and has no place in a
civilized society.
Recognition of the inappropriateness of
marital exemption is, however, only the first step towards its
elimination. To effectively equalize treatment of marital and
non-marital rape, legislatures and judiciaries must take action.
Several countries have already been host to the abolition of
marital immunity, but their approaches may not be the most
effective. This Note examines the experiences of England and
Canada as examples of judicial and legislative abolition of
marital exemption, respectively. The Author explores several
factors that would lead to effective change, including timely
alignment with societal morals, thorough and thoughtful
considerationof the issues, and legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.
After reviewing the effectiveness of approaches such as those
employed in England and Canada, the Author argues that an
even better method would rely on equal protection provisions
found in state constitutions and internationaltreaties.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For centuries, husbands around the world have been granted
marital exemption1 to the crime of rape. It was not until the last half
of the twentieth century that marital rape was even recognized as a
legal problem. 2 Prior to that time, most believed that it was
impossible for a husband to rape his wife.3 This conclusion was

1.
Throughout this Note, the terms "marital exemption," "marital immunity,"
"spousal exemption," and "spousal immunity" are used interchangeably. All phrases
mean that a spouse cannot be convicted of raping his or her spouse (although there
have not been any cases in which a husband has pressed rape charges against his
wife).
2.
Melisa J. Anderson, Note, Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex-Examining the Effect
of the Criminalization of MaritalRape in England and the Republic of Ireland, 27 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 139 (1998).
3.
Id.
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justified under three separate theories: the implied consent theory,
4
the unities of person theory, and the property theory.
The most common theory behind the impossibility of marital
rape is the implied consent theory, which is structured around
contract law. 5
Stated succinctly by Sir Matthew Hale in the
seventeenth century, "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and the contract the wife hath given up herself
in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. '6 Hale
believed that "matrimonial consent" was irrevocable. 7 Variations on
Hale's strict irrevocability principle allow for a wife to revoke her
implied sexual consent only in times when "ordinary relations" in the
marriage are suspended.8 For example, a woman can revoke her
implied consent when she and her husband are separated.9 Until
recently, this view was widely accepted.10
The unity of person theory, on the other hand, does not even
recognize the wife as a separate being capable of being raped.'1 This
theory stems from the belief that when two people marry, they
become one. 12 The being of the woman is incorporated into that of the
husband such that the existence of the woman is effectively
suspended during marriage. 13 Marital rape is thus impossible
because a husband is not capable of raping himself. 14
From unity of person theory, it is not a far reach to the property
theory. Under property theory, by marriage a woman becomes the
property or chattel of her husband. 15 The goal behind this theory is
to "inspire and perpetuate marital harmony."'1 6 Under this view,
sexual intercourse can never be rape because the husband is merely
"making appropriate use of his property."' 17

4.

E.g., Sonya A. Adamo, Note, The Injustice of the MaritalRape Exemption: A

Survey of Common Law Countries, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 555, 557-60 (1989).

5.
Id. at 557-58; Constance Backhouse & Lorna Schoenroth, A Comparative
Study of Canadianand American Rape Law, 7 CAN.-US L.J. 173, 174 (1984).
6.

1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629

(Lawbook Exch. 2003) (1736).
7.
Adamo, supra note 4, at 558.
8.
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supranote 5, at 174-75.
9.
See e.g., R. v. Clark, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448, 449 (Assizes 1949) (where an
English court held that a separation order had revoked the wife's implied consent to
sexual relations and the husband could be found guilty of rape).
10.
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supranote 5, at 174.
11.
See Adamo, supra note 4, at 560; Anderson, supra note 2, at 147; Note, To
Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99
HARv. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1984) [hereinafter To Have and to Hold].
12.
Adamo, supra note 4, at 560.
13.
To Have and to Hold, supranote 11, at 1256.
14.

Adamo, supra note 4, at 560.

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 560; Anderson, supra note 2, at 146-47.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 147.
Adamo, supra note 4, at 560.
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In addition to these three main rationales, there are many
secondary reasons for the perpetuation of marital exemption, 18 the
first of which is evidentiary difficulty. 19 When a couple is married
and regularly engages in sexual activity, it can be quite difficult to
20
prove that one particular instance out of many was without consent.
Another concern is a vengeful wife that claims rape to blackmail her
innocent husband to get a more favorable divorce settlement. 2 1 A
third argument holds that permitting allegations of rape would cause
22
unrest and discord in the marriage and prevent reconciliation.
Finally, recognizing crimes within the marriage would allow for state
23
intrusion into the privacy of marriage, which is largely disfavored.
While there are undoubtedly other rationales for marital exemption,
these several are the most prominent and most frequently referenced.
Together these theories created a belief that marital exemption
was an appropriate legal doctrine. 24 As late as the mid-twentieth
century, there was no country that viewed a husband's having
forcible sex with his wife as a crime. 25 Over time, the movement for
equal rights of women extended into criminal law, and marital
exemption faded away in many countries around the world. While
the majority of countries still have marital exemption on the books in
some form or another,2 6 dozens of leading nations have completely
eliminated the exemption. 27 Of these latter countries, it has

18.
While some of these concepts are unique to rape within marriage, most are
not unique to marital rape and are also concerns for rape outside of marriage.
19.
Adamo, supranote 4, at 561.
20.
Id. at 561 (citing Michael D.A. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife,
Who[m] Can You Rape?" The MaritalRape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 9
(1981)).
21.
Adamo, supranote 4, at 561; Anderson, supra note 2, at 148.
22.
Adamo, supra note 4, at 561.
23.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 148.
24.
See, e.g., id. at 139.
25.
Id.
26.
See, e.g., Julie Mertus, Human Rights of Women in Central and Eastern
Europe, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 369 (1998) (listing Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and
Ukraine as still providing a marital exemption); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Rangita de
Silva-de Alwis, The Recently Revised Marriage Law of China: The Promise and the
Reality, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 251, 278 (2004) (listing India, Malaysia, Papua New
Guinea, and Yugoslavia as still proving a marital exemption).
27.
For example, Australia, Canada, England, Germany, Spain, and Sweden
have all eliminated marital immunity.
About.com, Is Marital Rape a Crime?,
http://marriage.about.com/cs/maritalrape/f/maritalrapelO.htm
(citing
U.S.
State
Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices) (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Is Marital Rape a
Crime?]. In some of the countries that have eliminated marital exemption, however,
marital rape is still treated less harshly than non-marital rape. For example,
husbands that rape their wives may receive a lower sentence than a man who rapes a
stranger. See, e.g., Kate Warner, Sentencing in Cases of Marital Rape: Towards
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primarily been the judiciary that has made the change, with the
legislature following behind at a later point, if at all. 28 In a few
countries, however, it has been the legislature that made the change
29
and the judiciary was forced to follow.
This Note explores the judicial and legislative methods of
eliminating marital exemption and the successes and failures of each.
Part II traces England's elimination of marital exemption, which will
serve as a model of the judicial method. Part III then examines the
legal reformation of marital rape in Canada, which serves as a model
of the legislative approach. Part IV discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of each of the two approaches using the English and
Canadian systems as models. Finally, Part V proposes a model for
future criminalization of marital rape in other countries around the
globe.

II. ENGLAND: A MODEL

OF THE JUDICIAL APPROACH

A. ChippingAway at Common Law: The Path Leading to Abolition of
MaritalImmunity
When Sir Matthew Hale made his now infamous assertion that a
man cannot rape his wife, he did so without citing any supporting
authority. 30 Despite this legal deficiency, his contention became the
common law of England. 31 In 1889, Justice Field, in a dissenting
opinion, brought the deficiency to light and stated that he believed
there were cases in which a wife could refuse intercourse and in
which a husband could be guilty of rape. 32
Justice Field's
commentary went unnoticed and marital exemption carried on,
unmodified, for over 150 more years.
The assault on marital immunity began with the case of R. v.
Clarke.33 After being married for eleven years, the wife obtained a
judicial separation order which contained a clause stating that she
was no longer bound to live with her husband. 34 Within two weeks of

Changing the Male Imagination, 20 LEGAL STUD. 592 (2000). Despite this inequity,
eliminating the exemption shows progression toward complete equality.
28.
See, e.g., Ogletree & de Silva-de Alwis, supra note 26, 277-78 (discussing
how Nepal eliminated marital immunity judicially).
29.
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, 160-65 (discussing how the Republic of
Ireland eliminated marital immunity); Laureen Snider, Legal Reform and Social
Control: The Dangers of Abolishing Rape, 13 INT'L J. Soc. L. 337, 339 (1985) (discussing
the process by which Canada eliminated marital immunity).
30.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 149.
31.
Id. at 149.
32.
R. v. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23, 57 (U.K.).
33.
[19491 2 All E.R. 448 (Assizes 1949).
34.

Id. at 449.
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obtaining the separation order, the wife was allegedly raped by her
husband. 3 5 Justice Byrne, the presiding judge, recognized that a
husband cannot generally be guilty of raping his wife but held that
when a wife has been granted a legal separation her implied consent
to marital intercourse is revoked. 36 The decision emphasized that it
was the legal instrument of separation that served to revoke
consent. 37 In a similar ruling shortly thereafter, Judge Lynskey went
one step further and found that not only was legal separation
sufficient to revoke consent, but previous judicial statements about
38
an absolute marital exemption were mere dicta.
Twenty years later in R. v. O'Brien, Justice Park extended the
legal separation theory by holding that a decree nisi effectively
terminates marriage and concurrently revokes consent to marital
intercourse. 39 A decree nisi is "[a] court's decree that will become
absolute unless the adversely affected party shows the court, within a
specified time, why it should be set aside. '40
The significant
difference between legal separation and a decree nisi is that a
separation under a decree nisi is not yet final. By holding that a
decree nisi is sufficient to revoke consent, Justice Park lowered the
threshold for revocation. During the same juncture in time, Lord
Lane in R. v. Steele found that an injunction preventing the husband
from molesting the wife was sufficient to revoke consent, but merely
seeking a protective order was not. 4 1 Lord Lane did not want the
threshold to be lowered any further.
Soon after R. v. Steele, the continuing erosion of marital
exemption was stalled when the Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act of
1976 was passed. The Act codified the common law of rape and
included the phrase "unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman"
within the definition of rape. 42 Because the Act did not provide a
definition of "unlawful," rape continued to be defined under common
'43
law and was thus construed as meaning "outside of marriage.
Under this definition, rape within marriage was not "unlawful" and
marital immunity would thus persist.
Not long after passage of the Act of 1976, however, the English
judiciary was faced with a landmark series of marital rape cases.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
R. v. Miller, [1954] 2 All E.R. 529, 532 (Assizes 1953).
[1974] 3 All E.R. 663, 665 (Crown Court 1974).

40.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).

41.
R. v. Steele, (1976) 65 Crim. App. 22, cited in R. v. R., [1991] 1 All E.R. 747
(Crown Court 1990).
42.
Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act, 1976, c. 82 (Eng.), cited in Anderson,
supra note 2, at 152.
43.

PETER ROOK & ROBERT WARD, ROOK AND WARD ON SEXUAL OFFENCES 51

(Sweet & Maxwell 1997) (citing Chapman, [1959] 1 Q.B. 100).
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These cases would lead to the elimination of the martial rape
exemption. The first of the series was R. v. R.[1], decided in July
1990 by Justice Owen. 44 The couple involved had married in August
1984 and separated in October 1989, at which time the wife left their
home with their child, and went to her parents' house.45 Two days
later, the husband called and told the wife that he was going to seek a
divorce. 46 A few weeks later, the husband broke into the home of his
wife's parents and either forced or attempted to force 4 7 his wife to
have sex.4 8 The question before the court was whether the husband's
actions fell under the definition of "unlawful sexual intercourse" as
codified in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976. Naturally,
the defense rested on Hale's statement that a man cannot rape his
49
wife and the husband's conduct therefore could not be unlawful.
But Justice Owen rejected Hale's statement as being made "at a time
when marriage was indissoluble. '50 After reviewing the developing
case law and distinguishing each prior case from the present case, 51
Justice Owen made his decision:
I accept that it is not for me to make the law. However, it is for me to
state the common law as I believe it to be. If that requires me to
indicate a set of circumstances which have not so far been considered as
sufficient to negative consent as in fact so doing, then I must do so. I
cannot believe that it is a part of the common law of this country that
when there has been a withdrawal of either party from cohabitation,
accompanied by a clear indication that consent to sexual intercourse
has been terminated, that that does not amount to a revocation of that
implicit consent. In those circumstances, it seems to me that there is
ample here . . . [that] would enable the prosecution to prove a charge of
52
rape or attempted rape against this husband.

Despite his finding that the husband could be charged with rape
and his dismissal of Hale's notorious statement, Justice Owen
appeared to base his conclusion more on the amount of violence the
53
husband used rather than a general distaste for marital exemption.

44.
[1991] 1 All E.R. 747 (Crown Court 1990). Throughout this Note, I will
refer to each level of appeal in the case of R. v. R. For the ease of the reader, I have
used [1] to indicate the case at trial level, [2] to indicate the first appellate level, and
[3] to indicate the appeal to the House of Lords.
45.
Id. at 753.
46.
Id.
47.
The factual issue of rape was left to the jury. Id. at 754.
48.
Id. at 753.
49.
Id. at 748.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 748-53.
52.
Id. at 754.
53.
See id. at 749, 751, 753; see also Nicole Westmarland, Rape Law Reform in
England and Wales § 4.1 (University of Bristol, School for Policy Studies Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 7, 2004), available at http://www.bris.ac.uk/sps/information/
working-papers.shtml (noting that Justice Owen's "dismissal of Hale appeared to
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In fact, he seems to have agreed with the notion of a wife's implied
consent to sexual intercourse with her husband. 54 What compelled
Justice Owen to his conclusion was the violence employed to utilize
the implied consent. He said he "[found] it hard . . . to believe that it
ever was common law that a husband was in effect entitled to beat
his wife into submission to sexual intercourse." 55 Rather than
eliminating marital exemption, Justice Owen's opinion merely carved
out another exception, albeit a substantial one. A wife's implied
consent could now be revoked with a legal separation, a decree nisi,
or an injunction, and in cases of violent compulsion.
R. v. R. [1] was appealed, but before the case was heard, the Law
Commission completed a paper regarding marital rape and the lower
courts heard and decided two other marital rape cases. In September
1990, the Law Commission completed its working paper, Rape within
Marriage.56 In this paper, the Law Commission stated that, with
exceptions, a husband cannot be convicted of raping his wife. 57 The
Law Commission listed the exceptions as they had developed in the
case law. 58 A husband lost his immunity:
(a) where an order of the court has been made which provides that a
wife should no longer be bound to cohabit with her husband (R. v.
Clarke [1949] 33 Criminal Appeal Reports 216);
(b) where there has been a decree of judicial separation or a decree nisi
of divorce on the ground that "between the pronouncement of decree
nisi and the obtaining of a decree absolute a marriage subsists as a
mere technicality" (R. v. O'Brien [1974] 3 All England Law Reports
663);
(c) where a court has issued an injunction restraining the husband
from molesting the wife or the husband has given an undertaking to the
court that he will not molest her (R. v. Steele [1976] 65 Criminal Appeal
Reports 22);
(d) in the case of R. v. Roberts ([1986] Criminal Law Reports 188), the
Court of Appeal found that where a non-molestation order of two
months had been made in favour of the wife her deemed consent to
intercourse did not revive on expiry of the order;
(e) Mr Justice Lynskey observed, obiter, in R. v. Miller ([1954] 2
Queen's Bench Division 282) that a wife's consent would be revoked by
an agreement to separate, particularly if it contained a non-molestation
clause;

relate more to the fact that there was physical force used ... than lack of consent per
Se").

R. v. R.[1], [1991] 1 All E.R. 747, 753 (Crown Court 1990).
54.
55.
Id.
Law Commission, Rape within Marriage (Working Paper No. 116 (1990))
56.
[hereinafter Rape within Marriage].
2.8, quoted in C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 56,
57.
Id.
65 (1995).
58.
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 65-66 (citing The
Law Commission).
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(f) Lord Justice Geoffrey Lane stated, obiter, in R. v. Steele that a
separation agreement with a non-cohabitation clause would have that
59
effect.

The Law Commission then noted that, regardless of other
justifications, the law of marital immunity cannot be justified by "the
nature of, or by the law governing, modern marriage. '60 The Law
Commission affirmed that common law still granted marital
immunity, but proposed that "the present marital immunity be
abolished in all cases. '61 The paper concluded with a request to
62
codify abolition of spousal immunity with an Act of Parliament.
The following month, still before the appeal of R. v. R.[1] was
heard, the second case of the landmark series, R. v. C., was heard by
Justice Simon Brown. 63 There, the husband and wife were living
apart, but there was no formal separation agreement. 64 During their
time apart, the husband was alleged to have participated with others
in abducting and sexually assaulting his wife. 65 Writing for the court,
Justice Simon Brown recognized Justice Owen's holding in R. v. R. [1]
as expanding the methods through which a wife could revoke her
implied consent, but was not satisfied. 66 He did not like the room
67
that R. v. R.[1] left for a man to legally force his wife to have sex.
Accordingly, Justice Simon Brown took a "radical" approach, which
had already been implemented in Scotland,6 8 and declared that
'69
"there is no marital exemption to the law of rape.
The third and final of the landmark cases was R. v. J., which was
also decided before the first appeal of R. v. R.[1].
Faced with
interpreting the word "unlawful" within the definition of rape, Justice
Rougier was torn between his desire to eliminate marital exemption
and his obligation to comply with the Sexual Offences (Amendment)
Act of 1976.70 If able, he was "prepared boldly to cut the Gordian
knot and to . . . sweep away an out-of-date rule and to declare that

59.
Id.
60.
Rape Within Marriage, supra note 56,
4.11, cited in C.R. v. United
Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 67.
61.
Id. 5.2, cited in C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 67.
62.

SUE LEES, RULING PASSIONS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE, REPUTATION AND THE

LAW 118 (1997).
63.
R. v. C., [1991] 1 All E.R. 755 (Crown Court 1990).
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 757.
67.
Id.
68.
See R. v. R.[2], [1991] 2 All E.R. 257, 264 (C.A. 1990) (labeling the approach
of the Scottish High Court of Justiciary in S. v. HM Advocate, which banned marital
exemption in Scotland, as "[t]he radical solution"). See also infra text accompanying
notes 86-91.
69.
R. v. C., 1 All E.R. at 758.
70.
R. v. J., [1991] 1 All E.R. 759, 765 (Crown Court 1990).
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marital exemption no longer existed. 7 1 But instead he heeded what
he felt was his judicial duty and interpreted "unlawful" as he thought
it meant at the time the Act was passed. 72 The husband was thus
held immune to charges of rape of his wife. 7 3 Justice Rougier wrote:
Once Parliament has transferred the offence from the realm of common
law to that of statute .. .then I have very grave doubt whether it is
open to judges to continue to discover exceptions to the general rule of
marital immunity by purporting to extend the common law any further.
The position is crystallized as at the making of the [Sexual Offences]
74
Act and only Parliament can alter it.

Justice Rougier concluded with a plea to Parliament to abolish
75
marital exemption in England.
It is in this setting that the appeal of R. v. R.[1] was finally
76
heard in March 1991 in the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division.
Again grappling with the meaning of "unlawful," the appellate court
summarized the opinions of Justices Owen, Simon Brown, and
Rougier as exemplifying each of three possible solutions. 77 The first
possible solution, utilized by Justice Rougier in R. v. J., was termed
the "literal approach. '78 This approach gave heavy weight to the
79
language of the 1976 Act and preserved the husband's immunity.
Rape could only occur where there was "unlawful" sexual intercourse
which meant "outside the bounds of matrimony. ' 80 The drawback of
this approach would be that it would overrule all those cases that
81
created an exception to marital immunity.
The second approach, employed by Justice Owen in R. v. R.[l],
Under this solution,
was labeled the "compromise solution. '8 2
"unlawful" would be interpreted so as to leave marital exemption
intact, but would also recognize all of the exceptions that had already
been carved out.8 3 It would also be construed to allow for additional
future potential exceptions.8 4 The shortcoming of this method would
be the continuing difficulty of defining and interpreting "unlawful" in
85
each individual case.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
R. v. R.[2], [1991] 2 All E.R. 257 (C.A. 1990).
Id. at 263-64.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 264.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The final alternative, applied by Justice Brown in R. v. C., was
referred to as the "radical solution. '8 6 This solution regarded Sir
Matthew Hale's proclamation as based in "fiction" and inconsistent
with the modern view of the marital relationship.8 7 It held that
punishing a husband for violence used in the course of rape, but not
for the rape itself, is "repugnant and illogical."8 8 Accordingly, marital
immunity should be altogether abolished.8 9 The main criticism of
this approach was that it required the court to disregard the
statutory provision of the 1976 Act. 90 Even if the court did not
disregard it altogether, it would be venturing beyond the "bounds of
judge-made law and trespass[ing] on the province of Parliament." 9 1
Despite its awareness of encroachment upon the realm of
Parliament, the appellate court adopted the radical solution,
92
dismissed the husband's appeal, and abolished marital immunity.
The court concluded that "the time [had] arrived when the law should
declare that a rapist remains a rapist subject to the criminal law,
irrespective of his relationship with his victim. '93 The appellate court
granted leave to appeal the case to the House of Lords. 94
In October 1991, the House of Lords delivered its decision in R.
v. R.[3].95 As did Justice Owen and the appellate court, the House of
Lords began with a review of England's case law and an examination
of Scotland's decision to eliminate marital exemption. 9 6 Following its
review, the court turned to the 1976 Act. The court found that if the
word "unlawful" meant "outside of marriage," it would effectively
eliminate the exceptions that had already been carved out (which
took place while still within marriage). 97 The court doubted that this
was the intent of Parliament because if it were, the statute would
have been more clear.98 But because Parliament did not make clear
this intent, the House of Lords concluded that the word "unlawful" in
the definition of rape must have been "mere surplusage." 99 The
House of Lords unanimously declared that marital exemption had no
place in modern law and abolished it; marital immunity in England
was no more. 1O0

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 265-66.
Id.
Id. at 266.
R. v. R.[3], [1991] 4 All E.R. 481 (H.L. 1991).
Id. at 483-89.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Concerned with his conviction, the husband in R. v. R. sought
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.' 01 Prior to his claim
reaching the European Court of Human Rights, however, Parliament
enacted the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994.102
Parliament had followed the advice the Law Commission gave in its
paper Rape within Marriage'0 3 and eliminated marital exemption
altogether. 10 4 It did this by removing the word "unlawful" from the
definition of rape. 0 5 There was now no doubt that marital immunity
ceased to exist in England.
Despite the abolition of marital exemption by Parliament, the
husband in R. v. R. continued his appeal to the European Court of
Human Rights, arguing that to convict him would amount to an ex
post facto conviction in violation of Article 7 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 10 6
Article 7 of the Convention
provides:
1.
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence under national or international law at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2.
This Article (art. 7) shall not prejudice the trial and
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time
when it was committed, was criminal according to the general
10 7
principles of law recognised by civilised nations.

In October 1995, the European Court of Human Rights released
its ruling on the matter. The court stated that under Article 7 of the
Convention, a crime must be clearly defined in the law, and a change
in said law cannot be retrospectively applied to an accused's
disadvantage.10 8 The court then noted that even once a law has been
drafted, it is subject to an "inevitable element of judicial
interpretation."'1 9 Applying these concepts to the facts of R. v. R, the
court found:
[t]he decisions of the Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords did
no more than continue a perceptible line of case-law development
dismantling the immunity of a husband from prosecution for rape upon

101.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 157.
102.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 (Eng.).
103.
See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
104.
The general notes to the statute state that the purpose of the change in
definition is to eliminate marital exemption. Current Law Statutes 1994, Vol. 3, at p.
33-159.
105.
Compare Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act, 1976, c. 82 (Eng.) with
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, § 168(3), sch. 11 (Eng).
106.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 157.
107.
European Convention on Human Rights, cited in C.R. v. United Kingdom,
335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 56, 68 (1995).
108.
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 68-69.
109.
Id. at 69.

2006]

CRIMINALIZING MARITAL RAPE
his wife ....
There was no doubt under the law as it stood on
12 November 1989 that a husband who forcibly had sexual intercourse
with his wife could, in various circumstances, be found guilty of rape.
Moreover, there was an evident evolution, which was consistent with
the very essence of the offence, of the criminal law through judicial
interpretation towards treating such conduct generally as within the
scope of the offence of rape. This evolution had reached a stage where
judicial recognition of the absence of immunity had become a
reasonably foreseeable development of the law .... 110

The court held that there was no violation of Article 7(1) of the
Convention."'i
In summary, the elimination of marital exemption in England
was spearheaded by a judiciary that was sensitive to the changing
views of society. As cases of marital rape were presented, the courts
slowly chipped away at the spousal immunity doctrine. After several
exceptions had been carved out, it became clear that the doctrine as a
whole had become exceedingly outdated, and, as a result, the House
of Lords ended its reign. It was not until years later that Parliament
12
codified what had long since become the common law of England.
B. Public Response to Judicial Criminalizationof MaritalRape
The steady transition leading to the abolition of spousal
immunity was not without criticism. The first solid criticism came
from Richard White in late 1990 in response to the Law Commission's
Rape Within Marriage."' White essentially argued that eliminating
marital immunity would have adverse effects on the family. He said
that the point is not whether "a wife should ... be permitted to put
her own interests before those of her family," but rather what would
be the effect on marriage." 4 "Given the alleged reluctance of many
women to consent to intercourse without some degree of persuasion,
what would be the effect on the attitude of men of the threat of
rape?""1 5
Two months later, Professor Glanville Williams wrote an even
sharper attack against Rape Within Marriage."6
In his first
paragraph, Williams declared that the authors of the "heavily
slanted" working paper had given into "feminist pressure-groups."' 7
While Williams conceded that marital rape laws needed to be
modified, he felt that "charge of rape [was too] powerful (and even

110.
Id. at 71-72.
111.
Id. at 72.
112.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 (Eng.).
113.
Richard White, Marital Rape, 140 NEW L.J. 1727 (1990).
114.
Id. at 1727-28.
115.
Id. at 1728.
116.
Glanville Williams, The Problem of Domestic Rape (pts. 1-2), 141 NEW L.J.
205, 246 (1991).
117.
Id. at 205.
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self-destructive) a weapon to put in the wife's hands."1 18 Williams
preferred that a violent rape between spouses be governed by assault
laws. 119 He also suggested that law governing rape between partners
should track cohabitation. 120 If cohabiting, a man should be immune
from being convicted of raping his partner. 12 1 But if not cohabiting, a
man would be subject to the full force of rape laws. 122 Williams also
had a strong objection to the word "rape" because, in his opinion, it
stigmatizes the defendant and encourages harsher sentences than
123
necessary.
As would be expected, there was strong negative public reaction
to Williams's article. 124 Implicitly, Parliament rejected Williams's
ideas through the abolition of marital exemption.
Interestingly
though, the judiciary did, and still does, embrace large portions of his
rhetoric. For instance, even following the criminalization of marital
rape, husbands convicted of raping their wives have received lower
sentences than their non-married counterparts. 125
Another
indication that the judiciary supported some of Williams's rhetoric
was the position of Sir Frederick Lawton, former Lord Justice who
chaired the Criminal Law Revision Committee in 1984.126 Two years
prior to the ruling in R. v. R. [3], Sir Frederic agreed that marital rape
should not be criminalized. 12 7 He argued that floods of women would
go running to police stations with complaints of rape. 128 Five years
after abolition of marital immunity and when only twelve cases of an
alleged rape by a cohabiting husband had been brought, Sir Frederick
was again asked his view on the subject. 129 Despite the low number
1 30
of complaints, he said he had not changed his mind.
Sir Frederic, however, was not the only one concerned about a
"wave of prosecutions.' 13 1 On October 24, 1991, an article in the
London Times claimed that a "flurry of prosecutions [was] expected to
follow [the] House of Lords ruling ... that men can be found guilty of

118.
Id. at 206.
119.
Id. at 247.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 246.
124.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 159.
125.
Id.; see generally Philip N.S. Rumney, When Rape Isn't Rape: Court of
Appeals Sentencing Practice in Cases of Marital and Relationship Rape, 19 OXFORD J.
LEG. STUD. 243 (1999).

126.
LEES, supra note 62, at 119.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
LEES, supra note 62, at 118 (citing Frances Gibb, Marital Rape Ruled
Illegal by Law Lords, TIMES (London), 24 October 1991, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Times and Sunday Times (London) File).
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raping their wives. ' 132 Other critics said that while they agreed with
the change in law, they felt that it was for Parliament to make the
change, not the judiciary. 133 "The law was ripe for change, but it was
'1 34
not for the law lords to do it.
Many who opposed elimination of the spousal exemption were
women. Days after the ruling of R. v. R., Barbara Amiel, a columnist
for the London Times, wrote:
I do not know of a single successful case in those countries that allow
charges of marital rape. Juries see how ludicrous it is to be faced with
husbands and wives living together who had lovely sexual intercourse
on Monday, an OK time on Tuesday, but on Wednesday the husband
raped the wife. Sexual intercourse can be a moment of ecstasy or a
nightmare of utter humiliation, depending on such intangibles as mood,
timing and one's subjective appreciation of the partner's characteristics.
The law cannot protect us from intercourse that is simply inconvenient,
13 5
untimely or a weapon within a marriage.

Thus far, a grim picture has been painted of the public reaction
to the abolition of marital rape. But there were also many who
celebrated the event. Claire Glasman, spokeswoman for Women
Against Rape, said:
This is a fantastic day for women everywhere. The law lords have
finally nailed a legal lie which has somehow survived for nearly three
centuries. This is really a step towards making it clear legally that
women have the right to say 'no' to sex, even if they are married. It
overturns 250 years of legal sexual slavery based not on a court case
but on an 18th century judge's decision that a husband could not rape
136
his wife.

John Patten, the Home Office minister, also rejoiced in the
He commented that rape is rape, regardless of the
ruling. 137
relationship of the parties. 138 He felt that the law was in need of
clarification in this area and that the ruling in R. v. R. provided that
clarification. 139 Another citizen said that she was very happy with
the ruling, but wanted it to be followed up with a law passed by

132.
Frances Gibb, Marital Rape Ruled Illegal by Law Lords, TIMES (London),
October 24, 1991, at front page, available at LEXIS, News Library, Times and Sunday
Times (London) File.
133.
See e.g., id.
Id. (quoting Lord Denning, former Master of the Rolls).
134.
135.
Barbara Amiel, Why Law Lords got it Wrong on Marital Rape, TIMES
(London), October 27, 1991, at front page, available at LEXIS, News Library, Times
and Sunday Times (London) File.
136.
Gibb, supra note 132, at 2.
137,
Id.
138.
Id.
Id.
139.
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Parliament. 140 She was concerned only by the ability of the courts to
141
revert back to spousal immunity.
In 1994, when Parliament enacted the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act of 1994,142 eliminating spousal immunity for good,
most concerns were assuaged. Skeptics could no longer complain of
judicial lawmaking-the decision in R. v. R. was now codified by
Parliament. And those who worried that the courts would reinstate
marital immunity could rest easy because they were now bound by
statute. Until Parliament gave its stamp of approval, criminalization
of marital rape suffered from a split in public endorsement.

III. CANADA: A MODEL

OF THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH

A. Feminist Activism and ParliamentaryNotice of a Problem Leading to a Change in MaritalRape Law
Canada's history of marital exemption began in England, as
Canada did not gain independence from England until July 1,
1867.143 Like England, Canada's history is rooted in Lord Hale's
famous statement and the notion that a man was incapable of raping
his wife because marriage created an irrevocable implied consent to
sexual relations. 144 In 1892, this position was first codified in Canada
in the 1892 Criminal Code. 145 The code defined rape as "the act of a
man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is not his wife without
her consent, or with consent, which has been extorted by threats or
fear of bodily harm .... ,"146 The Criminal Code reflected both the
14 7
common law of Canada and England at the time.
Just over fifty years later, England began carving out exceptions
to its marital immunity doctrine. 148 Canada's rape laws, however,
remained unaffected by the progression of England's laws. 149 From
Canada's beginning, no rape cases were heard in the Canadian
150
judiciary in which the complainant and the accused were married.

140.

Id. (quoting Jo Richardson, Labour's spokeswoman on women's affairs).

141.

Id.

142.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 (Eng.).
143.
Canada did not gain independence from England until July 1, 1867. See
Canada, Ceremonial and Canadian Symbols Promotion: Canada Day, at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/cpsc-ccsp/jfa-ha/canadae.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
144.
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 5, at 174.
145.
Criminal Code, 1982, ch. 29, § 266, 1892-1893 Can. Stat. 107, 208, cited in
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 5, at 175 n.17.
146.
Id. (emphasis added).
147.
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 5, at 175.
148.
See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing R. v. Clarke).
149.
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 5, at 175.
150.
Id. at 176.
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The only mention of rape during marriage was in King v. Faulkner,
151
where the trial court convicted the accused of raping a young girl.
On appeal, the defense argued that the case should have been
withdrawn from the jury because the government had failed to prove
that the girl was not married to the accused. 15 2 The court of appeal
rejected this argument because it felt that there was plenty of
evidence available to show that the young girl was not married to the
Because the court gave credence to the defense's
accused. 153
argument, this case illustrates that the status of being married would
have probably served as an affirmative defense to rape charges.
In 1970, Canada again codified spousal immunity. 154 Section
143 of the 1970 Criminal Code replaced the 1892 provision and
provided that "[a] male person commits rape when he has sexual
intercourse with a female person who is not his wife . . . -155 Again,
no cases of marital rape were reported. 15 6 "The total absence of
reported Canadian cases concerning a charge of rape brought by a
wife against her husband suggest[ed] that the language in section 143
[of the 1970 Criminal Code] ha[d] been given a strict interpretation
by prosecutors."' 157 Because marital rape cases were never reported,
the Canadian judiciary had its hands tied when it came to the
elimination of marital exemption. The only mechanism capable of
158
changing rape law was statutory amendment.
During the ten years following the enactment of the 1970
Criminal Code, a feminist movement arose with an aim, among
many, of amending rape laws and eliminating spousal immunity. 159
The main focus of the feminist movement was the way in which the
legal system handled rape-with male perspectives and interests in
mind. 16 Feminists believed that rape provisions exemplified gender
They asserted that rape laws "embodied the
inequalities. 161

19 C.C.C. 47 (Court of Appeal for British Columbia, 1911), available at
151.
1911 C.C.C. LEXIS 349.
Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
152.
153.
Id.
154.
An Act Respecting the Criminal Law, R.S.C., ch. C 34, § 143 (1970), cited in
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 5, at 176 n.20 [hereinafter 1970 Criminal Code].
Id. (emphasis added).
155.
156.
See Joanna McFayden, Inter-Spousal Rape: The Need for Law Reform, in
FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 193, 198 n.3

(John M Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1978).
157.

Id.

158.
Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 5, at 176.
159.
See Lorenne M.G. Clark, Feminist Perspectives on Violence Against Women
and Children: Psychological, Social Service, and Criminal Justice Concerns, 3 CAN. J.
WOMEN & L. 420, 421 (1989-1990).
Danette C. Cashman, Negotiating Gender: A Comparison of Rape Laws in
160.
Canada,Finland, and Pakistan,9 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 120, 125 (2000).
Id.
161.
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prejudices and fears of the dominant male group."'1 62 The world that
women faced in Canada in the 1970s consisted of laws that allowed a
husband to rape his wife, evidentiary rules that required a woman's
testimony to be corroborated (showing male distrust of women), a
police force that dismissed more than 50% of reported sexual attacks
as unfounded, and relatively short sentences for men actually
convicted of rape. 163 In response, feminists argued that the woman's
164
perspective and experience of rape should shape rape laws.
Marital immunity was a prime target of the feminist movement
in Canada. 165 Many members of the feminist movement stated that
they were gravely concerned "that the subordination of women as
wives to their husband's sexual demands [was] a perpetuation of sexrole dependency relationships.' 1 66
Marital immunity, they
contended, perpetuated the myth that women were subordinate to
men and desired to be dominated by them. 167 The idea of sexual
submission, in turn, affirmed perceptions that women lacked the
"need, capacity or right to exercise free will.' 168 Women further
argued that allowing a husband to rape his wife without legal
consequence was an attack on a woman's physical integrity. 169 They
strongly objected to the doctrine of implied consent. 170 As a solution,
feminists advocated a generic sexual assault provision that treated
171
men, women, spouses and non-spouses equally.
In an effort to achieve this goal, the early approach of feminists
was to attack traditional ideas of gender roles which viewed the "man
as ... sexually
aggressive
and
[the]
woman as... sexually
passive."' 172 They argued that not only were these stereotypes
inaccurate and harmful to women, but they were harmful to men as
well. 173 The stereotypes put pressure on men and women to fulfill
their predetermined roles which in turn prevented people from "inter174
relating through their full potential."'
The strategy then turned to emphasizing the violent nature of
rape. 175 The new "rape-as-violence" approach attempted to divorce

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
rape, but
discussion
172.
173.
174.
175.

Snider, supra note 29, at 339.
Id. at 339-40.
Cashman, supra note 160, at 185.
Id. at 125.
McFayden, supra note 156, at 194.
Id.
Id.
Cashman, supra note 160, at 125.
Id.
Id. at 128-29. Feminists not only sought modification of the definition of
also change in the rules of evidence. Id. at 126. I have confined my
to the elimination of marital exemption specifically.
Id. at 128-29.
McFayden, supra note 156, at 194.
Id.
Cashman, supra note 160, at 132.
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rape from its sexual qualities. 176 This was a natural extension of the
already prevailing notion of self-integrity and protection of one's
body. 177 Because of its relation to already prevailing ideologies, this
178
strategy was successful in initiating legislative reform.
In 1971, the federal government set up the Law Reform
Commission to review the entire Criminal Code. 1 79 Low conviction
rates, patriarchal attitudes in old rape laws, and the increasing
feminist literature all spurred the government response.' 8 0 In 1978,
the Law Reform Commission completed its analysis of the Criminal
Code and published it in Report Number 10.181 The Report effectively
legitimized feminist objections to the current rape laws and suggested
solutions.' 8 2 The Commission stated that current rape laws did in
fact embody outdated and incorrect perceptions of women.' 83 As a
solution, the Commission suggested that rape laws be amended to
reflect a more modern view of the crime of rape. 8 4 This included
amending the Criminal Code to make rape "a crime of violence rather
than of passion." 18 5 The Commission stated that rape had nothing to
do with sexuality, but rather was an expression of dominance and
power. 18 6 Section 143 of the 1970 Criminal Code (defining rape), they
urged, should be eliminated, and in its place the crime of "sexual
"Sexual interference" was
interference" should be implemented.
for
sexual purposes without
basically defined as touching another
87
consent.1
In 1981, shortly after publication of Report Number 10, Bill C-52
was introduced to Parliament by the government.' 8 8 Bill C-52, aimed
at amending the Criminal Code, died before gaining force, and Bill C53 was considered in its place.' 8 9 Bill C-53 sought to re-label nonconsensual sexual relations as "assaults" rather than "crimes of

176.
177.

Id. at 185.
Id. at 132.

178.
179.
180.

Id.
Snider, supranote 29, at 337.
Id. at 339.

181.
Id. at 338 (citing LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT
SEXUAL OFFENCES (1978)).

Id. at 340. Because the Law Reform Commission was set
182.
entire section of the Criminal Code, it also suggested several
pertaining to other activities, such as the age of consent and incest.
however, has confined this Note's review to only those suggestions
marital exemption.
183.
Id.
184.

Id.

185.
186.

Id.
Id.
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188.

Id.
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189.
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It also proposed the elimination of rape, indecent
passion."190
assault, and attempted rape. In the place of these crimes, the law
would recognize simple sexual assault and aggravated sexual
assault.191
For three and a half months, the Standing Committee on Justice
and Legal Affairs considered Bill C-53.192 The Committee received
150 submissions and heard from seventeen different groups and three
individuals. 193 The majority of the groups advocated an expansion of
the proposed two-tier sexual assault provision (simple and
aggravated) to a three-tiered provision (also to include sexual assault
with a weapon). 194 Overall, there was general support for the idea
behind Bill-53, but there was disagreement over the details. 195
After all representatives had been heard, negotiations
commenced. The negotiations began on June 15, 1982, with the
Committee tabling forty-two pages of amendments proposed by the
government. 19 6 Eight more amendments were proposed on July 8,
1982, and a third set of amendments were proposed the following
day. 19 7 On July 29, 1982, after eleven negotiation meetings with
198
relevant officials, Bill C-127 was introduced.
Bill C-127, which was eventually voted into law, included
portions of the Law Reform Commission's Report, Bill C-52, and Bill
C-53. Regarding marital rape, Bill C-127 proposed replacing the
current definition of rape 99 with a three-tiered sexual assault
offense. 200 Nowhere did marital immunity appear in the proposed
bill. Indeed, the Minister of Justice spoke of "ending the 'inequity of
the present law' which placed an 'unfair burden on female victims of
sexual assault .... ,,,201 The Minister also strongly rejected any
proposed changes that would not allow a wife to charge her husband
with rape. 20 2
He said that such changes would damage the

190.
Id. This change was also proposed by the Law Reform Commission in its
report.
191.
Id. at 340-41.
192.
Id. at 343.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
A group of defense lawyers did, however, dislike the bill in its entirety.
They claimed that it was "poorly written, absurd, carelessly conceived, and much too
severely flawed to be fixed up." Id.
196.
Id. at 345.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
"A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female
person who is not his wife .... 1970 Criminal Code, supranote 154 (emphasis added).
200.
Snider, supranote 29, at 340-41.
201.
Id. at 347 (quoting Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs Respecting Bill C-53, House of Commons,
Issues §77-106, at 77:29 (1982)).
202.
Id.
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institution of the family. 20 3 Bill C-127 was passed into law August 4,
1982, and went into effect January 1, 1983.204 The new law repealed
§ 143 of the old code and replace it with §§ 246.1-246.8.205 Sections
246.1-246.3 present the three-tiered sexual assault offenses: sexual
assault, sexual assault with a weapon, and aggravated sexual
assault. 20 6 Sections 246.4-246.8 lay out evidentiary rules for these
20 7
sexual offenses.
For Canada, the elimination of spousal immunity can be almost
entirely attributed to the feminist movement. During Parliamentary
debates surrounding Bill C-127, one Member of Parliament stated:
Individual women and groups of women all across the country have
been pushing for changes to the rape laws. It was apparent that this
I believe this piece
section of the Criminal Code cried out for reform ....
of legislation will mark a new beginning in the way society views
coercive sexual acts. This legislation makes clear a statement. It calls
a spade a spade. It says that sexual assault is primarily an act of
208
violence, not of passion; an assault with sex as a weapon.

In summary, the elimination of marital exemption in Canada
occurred legislatively to reflect the changes in the views of society.
Parliament responded, ex post facto, to the cries of its citizens.
B. Reactions to the Passageof Bill C-127
The response to marital rape and other forms of domestic
violence in Canada did not stop with the passage of Bill C-127. At the
same time changes were made to the criminal laws themselves,
changes were also made to the rules of evidence that were favorable
to victims of rape in general. 20 9 Rape victims were no longer required
to have their testimony corroborated, the doctrine of recent complaint
was revoked, and cross-examination on past sexual behavior was
210
severely restricted.
Also at the same time, federal and provincial Attorneys General
and Solicitors General were developing policy changes of their own.
One such policy mandate required police to lay criminal charges

203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id. at 338.
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Offences), S.C., c. 125, ss. 6

and 19 (1982) (Can.).

206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Hon. Flora MacDonald, reported in House of Commons Debates (4 Aug.

1992) at 20041, cited in Renu Mandhane, Efficiency or Autonomy?: Economic and
Feminist Legal Theory in the Context of Sexual Assault, 59 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 173, 181
(2001).

209.
(1992).
210.

Hon. Bertha Wilson, Family Violence, 5 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 137, 138
Id.
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where it was reasonable and probable that domestic violence
occurred. 2 11 Once the charges were laid, the Crown Attorney would
then usually handle the case. 212 This policy was "established in
response to public concern over the victimization of women and
involve[d] specialized [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] training on
the laying of charges in cases of spousal assault. ' 213 The most
notable effect of the policy change was to remove from214women the
responsibility and blame associated with laying charges.
The year 1989, seven years after Bill C-127 was enacted,
signaled a change in the attitude of courts towards the sentencing of
domestic violence defendants. 215 In R. v. Inwood, the Ontario Court
of Appeal imposed a thirty-day jail sentence on a first time domestic
violence offender. 216 The court wrote: "[d]omestic assaults are not
private matters, and spouses are entitled to protection from violence
just as strangers are."2 17 Another amendment to the Criminal Code
in 1997 made it clear that Parliament wanted the offender's status of
as in a
being in a position of trust in relation to the victim, such
2 18
spousal relationship, to be an aggravating circumstance.
Beginning in the 1990s, several provinces established domestic
violence courts. 219 These courts were designed to allow a special
focus on the nature of domestic violence cases. 220 The courts, still
operating today, operate under components such as "zero-tolerance"
222
pro-arrest policy,22 1 enhanced investigative procedures for police,
223
and specialized processing to expedite the cases.
Despite all of these changes, however, it is still quite rare for a
husband to be charged with sexual assault of his wife. 224 Marital
rape is inherently difficult to research because victims are likely to
deny or minimize the extent of the abuse and are reluctant to

Press Release, Canadian Government, Justice Minister and Solicitor
211.
General Take Steps Against Spousal Assault (Dec. 21, 1983), found in Spousal Abuse
Policies and Legislation: Final Report of the Ad Hoc Federal-Provincial-Territorial
Working Group Reviewing Spousal Abuse Policies and Legislation, available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/fmi/fpta.html [hereinafter Against Spousal Assault].
212.
Id. at 101.
Id. (quoting Solicitor General Bob Kaplan).
213.
214.
Id.
215.
Nicholas Bala, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, Joel Miller's Family
Law Center (Nov. 7, 1999), at http://www.familylawcentre.com/05cases-n-comments/
cnc08-misc.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
216.
Id. (citing O.J. NO. 428 (Ont. C.A. 1989)).
217.
Id.
Id.
218.
Against Spousal Assault, supra note 211, at 40-48.
219.
220.
Id. at 40.
221.
Id.
Id. at 43.
222.
Id. at 44.
223.
Bala, supra note 215. This observation was made in 1999. It is possible
224.
that there has been an increase since that time.
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complain. 2 25 A survey in 1994 revealed that only one-quarter of
victims of domestic violence reported the abuse to the police; between
1994 and 1999 the number of reported cases increased to 37%,227 but
that still leaves nearly two-thirds of the cases unreported.

IV. SHORTCOMINGS AND SUCCESSES: THOROUGH AND TIMELY REVIEW
VERSUS LEGITIMACY

The strengths of the judicial and legislative approaches largely
mirror the other approach's weaknesses. The judicial approach excels
in the process leading up to the change, but struggles with legitimacy
in the eyes of citizens. Conversely, the legislative approach excels in
public endorsement once the change has been made, but struggles
with making the change actually happen. Some of the weaknesses
and strengths discussed below are specific to the problem of marital
rape, but some are the same critical features that are common to any
discussion of the roles of legislatures and judiciaries. 228 For instance,
the argument against "judicial law-making" is an argument common
to any discussion on judicial activism, not just a discussion of marital
rape.
A. The JudicialApproach
1. Advantages: Holistic Review of an Historical Concept
The primary advantage of the judicial method is its ability to
reflect a change in the attitude of the general population in a timely
manner. In England, for instance, the judiciary abolished marital
exemption in 1991229 whereas Parliament did not codify the change
until 1994.230 Throughout the transition period, judges hearing
marital rape cases repeatedly stated that they were bringing common

225.

Id.

227.

STATUS OF WOMEN CANADA, FACT SHEET: STATISTICS ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN CANADA 3, at http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/dates/dec6/facts-e.pdf (last visited
Jan. 9, 2006) (citing STATISTICS CANADA, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN CANADA: A STATISTICAL
PROFILE 2000 (2000)).

228.
For instance, the argument that it is not the job of the judiciary to make
law is an argument common to any discussion on judicial activism, not just a
discussion of marital rape.
229.
R. v. R.[3], [1991] 4 All E.R. 481, 489 (H.L. 1991).
230.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 (Eng.).
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law into line with the current values of society. 23 ' As stated in R v.
C., "Common law must advance and change with changing attitudes
and mores of society." 23 2 They also spoke of Lord Hale's famous
23 4
and
statement as an5 "age-old understanding, ' 23 3 "anachronistic,"
23
an "archaism.
The judicial approach also allows for a more gradual change that
can take into account precise facts. In England, courts began to
review spousal immunity in 1949.236 Over the next forty-two years,
the courts were able to consider different occurrences of marital rape
and determine the appropriateness of spousal immunity. Through
their judgments and dicta, judges were able to signal to other judges
and citizens the direction of the courts and address such issues as the
appropriate cases for the exemption and the effects of the exemption.
One by one, situations could be examined; it was not an all-or-nothing
proposition. In fact, the courts were not comfortable with eliminating
the exemption altogether until they had reviewed nearly twenty
different situations. This approach ensures that all angles are
considered.
Similarly, the judicial method allows for several different
arguments to be made to several different judges, and under several
different circumstances. In England, various attorneys made various
arguments before various judges. In each case, the defense attorney
argued in favor of spousal immunity while the prosecution argued for
either an exception to the exemption or its complete abolition.
Arguments for maintaining the spousal immunity ranged from "that's
the way it's always been" 237 to statutory construction arguments
about the 1976 Act. Arguments for eliminating the exemption ranged
from claims that the exemption started as a fiction (referring to the
lack of legal support for Lord Hale's statement) 23 8 to arguing that the
word "unlawful" in the 1976 Act means more than merely "outside
239
marriage."
Finally, by examining marital rape in a judicial setting, the
voices of a cross-section of society are heard. Cases are brought by
victims who have chosen to speak up, regardless of their position in
society. On the other hand, only a relatively small group of citizens is
usually even aware of proposed legislation. The legislative process is

231.
See, e.g., R. v. R.[2], [1991] 2 All E.R. 257, 264, 265 (C.A. 1990) ("changing
social attitudes") ("now as the law has developed and arrived in late twentieth
century"); R. v. C., [1991] 1 All E.R. 755, 758 (Crown Court 1990).
R. v.C., [1991] 1 All E.R. at 760.
232.
233.
Id. at 758.
234.
R. v. R.[2], [1991] 2 All E.R. at 266.
R. v. C., [1991] 1 All E.R. at 760.
235.
R. v. Clarke, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448 (Assizes 1949).
236.
R. v.C., [1991] 1 All E.R. at 756-57.
237.
238.
R. v. J., [1991] 1 All E.R. 759, 760 (Crown Court 1990).
239.
See, e.g., R. v. J., [1991] 1 All E.R. at 763.
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most often influenced principally by interest groups. Those who are
responsible for making legislative decisions are not likely to have
experienced marital rape or even heard about it secondhand. In a
judicial setting, however, those who have firsthand experience have a
chance to have their voices heard. In the case of marital rape,
because it is so personal, this may be a more effective and adaptive
form of legal reform.
2. Disadvantages: Legitimacy, Retrospectivity, and Case Dependency
The judicial approach as implemented in England is not,
however, without faults.
Three primary, and seemingly
insurmountable, shortcomings plague the judicial method. The first
weakness is the argument most often employed against "judicial lawmaking"240 : it is not the judiciary's job to make law. 241 It is not for
242
the court to make the law but rather to state common law as it is.
If the court abolishes marital immunity, it has gone "beyond the
legitimate bounds of judge-made law. ' 243 This concern is not unique
to the issue of marital rape and plagues many judicial opinions in all
areas of the law. 244 It suffices to say that this is a valid criticism of
judicial elimination of spousal immunity that should be taken into
account when analyzing the approach.
Another shortcoming, common among all judicial modifications
to criminal law, is the concern of retrospective application of the

240.
The Author has chosen to put this term in quotations because it is not a
settled issue. Some would hold that when the courts eliminate marital immunity, they
are effectively making law. See, e.g., P.R. Ghandhi & J.A. James, Marital Rape and
Retrospectivity-the Human Rights Dimensions at Strasbourg, 9 CHILD FAM. L.Q. 17,
28 (1997). But others would say that the courts are not at all making law, but rather
interpreting the common law and bringing it in line with modern times. See, e.g., R. v.
R.[2], [1991] 2 All E.R. 257, 266 (C.A. 1990).
241.
See, e.g., R. v. R.[1], [1991] 1 All E.R. 747, 754 (Crown Court 1990) ("I
accept that it is not for me to make the law."); R. v. J., [1991] 1 All E.R. at 767.
Once Parliament has transferred the offence from the realm of common law to
that of statute ... then I have very grave doubt whether it is open to judges to
continue to discover exceptions to the general rule of marital immunity by
purporting to extend the common law any further. The position is crystallized
as at the making of the Act and only Parliament can alter it.
Gibb, supra note 132 ("The law was ripe for change, but it was not for the law lords to
do it." (quoting Lord Denning, former Master of the Rolls)).
242.
See, e.g., R. v. R.[1], [1991] 1 All E.R. at 754.
243.
R. v. R.[2], [1991] 2 All E.R. at 264.
244.
This issue could easily have an entire article devoted to its discussion. For
the purposes of this Note, however, the Author prefers to stay focused on marital
immunity. For more on the relationship between judge-made law and legislatures, see
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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law. 245 "[T]he law must be adequately accessible-an individual
must have an indication of the legal rules applicable in a given caseand he must be able to foresee the consequences of his actions, in
particular, to be able to avoid incurring the sanction of criminal
law."246 Under this principle, a court cannot fundamentally alter the
elements of an offense to the detriment of the accused. 247 A court
law to reflect new
can, however, clarify or adapt the common
248
circumstances or developments in society.
Application of this principle to marital exemption leads to a
discourse similar to that in which the European Court of Human
Rights engaged in C.R. v. United Kingdom. 24 9 On the one hand, prior
to a case that completely abolishes the marital immunity doctrine,
the law allowed for one to rape his wife. 250 By eliminating the
exemption, the courts are creating a new criminal offense. 25 1 The key
is that at the time of the rape, the man knew it to be legal to force sex
upon his wife. 25 2 Permitting this sort of retroactive application of law
allows for arbitrariness. It is arbitrary for the courts, rather than the
legislature, to change the law.
On the other hand, it is arguably unreasonable to say that
retrospectivity should have barred the abolition of marital exemption
for two reasons. For one, once the series of exceptions that had been
carved out were accounted for, nothing was really left of the spousal
immunity doctrine. 25 3 A man had available to him the various
exceptions to spousal immunity and should have been cautious if
relying on the exemption. 254 Eliminating the immunity, therefore,
had little actual effect. Secondly, Lord Hale's proposition was based
place. 255
on legal fiction, and arguably, was never good law in the first 256
Eliminating the exemption is merely removing a legal fiction.
The final weakness of the judicial method is simply stated and is
unique to marital rape-cases must be prosecuted. If instances of

See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, art. 7 (prohibiting
245.
retrospective application of criminal law); Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity:
The Founders' View, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 489 (2003) (discussing retrospective laws and
the U.S. Constitution); Daniel James White, Ex Post Facto Excepted: Rogers v.
Tennessee And The PermissibleRetroactive Application of Judge Made Law, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1141 (2003).
246.
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 56, 68 (1995), at 390.
Id. at 390.
247.
248.
Id.
Id.
249.
250.
Id. at 391.
See Ghandhi & James, supranote 240, at 28.
251.
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 395.
252.
253.
See id. at 392.
254.
This assumes that a man actually plots to rape his wife and considers the
legal consequences before committing the act.
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 391.
255.
See Ghandhi & James, supranote 240, at 19.
256.
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marital rape are not being prosecuted, the courts will have no
opportunity to hear arguments, examine facts, or make judgments on
the current state of the law. The cause of this failure to prosecute can
be either the victim's unwillingness to press charges 257 or the
unwillingness of prosecutors to proceed.
In a situation of prosecutorial opposition, it is very difficult for
the judiciary to make inroads toward the abolition of marital
immunity. The prosecutors may be refusing cases because they feel
that the law does not permit marital rape cases to be brought. 258 Or
they may be refusing to prosecute because they personally feel that it
is not appropriate for a wife to charge her husband with rape. In
countries where marital immunity has been a longstanding practice,
it would not be surprising for prosecutors to refuse prosecution. To
maneuver around such instances of prosecutor opposition is very
difficult without the legislature stepping in to require prosecution of
marital rape.
The situation of victim reluctance is less obstructive to the
judicial method and can be managed. In Canada, even after the
abolition of spousal immunity, victims were not pressing charges for
marital rape. 25 9 In response, the Attorneys General and Solicitors
General, without legislative or judicial mandate, began requiring
police to lay criminal charges and for Crown Attorneys to handle the
case. 260 Various provinces also began establishing domestic violence
courts, showing a willingness to prosecute, also without judicial or
26 1
legislative mandate.
B. The Legislative Method
1. Advantages: Legitimacy and Prosecutorial Independence
As previously mentioned, the advantages and disadvantages of
each method largely mirror each other.
With respect to the
legislative approach, its advantages are all counterparts to the
disadvantages of the judicial approach. First and foremost, the
legislative approach is praised for not allowing the courts to do what
the legislature is charged with doing-make law. 262
When the
legislature is in fact the branch responsible for eliminating marital

257.
See Bala, supra note 215 (stating the unwillingness of a victim to press
charges can be the result of a number of factors including intimidation, humiliation,
and fear).
258.
See, e.g., McFayden, supra note 156, at 198 n.3.
259.
Bala, supra note 215.
260.
Press Release, Government of Canada, Justice Minister and Solicitor
General Take Steps Against Spousal Assault (Dec. 21, 1983), found in Against Spousal
Assault, supra note 211, at 100-01.
261.
Against Spousal Assault, supra note 211, at 1.
262.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-34, 240-44.
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exemption, the change is less susceptible to criticism of judicial
lawmaking. 26 3 Because eliminating marital immunity can be a
controversial issue, avoiding criticism and gaining legitimacy is an
important consideration.
In England, where the courts abolished marital exemption,
264
legislation was passed several years later confirming the abolition.
One can speculate that Parliament was aware that its laws may have
been held in higher esteem than a court ruling that so markedly
changed the law. And if there was any doubt of the legitimacy of the
ruling of the -House of Lords, Parliament cleared it up with
codification of its ruling. Speaking on the subject in 1994, Home
Office minister Earl Ferrers commented:
This simply confirms in statute what is already in law ....

But it is an

important declaration of Parliament's belief that a man who rapes his
wife can expect no special treatment

under the law . . . . The

amendment won't change the law's practical effect, but will represent
an unequivocal statement of the value Parliament places on a woman's
265
right to be protected against the dreadful crime of rape.

The legislative approach also avoids criticism of retrospective
266
application. By its very nature, legislation is applied prospectively.
Along with the respect given to legislation generally, this
characteristic helps foster legitimacy as compared to the judicial
method. Where legislation serves to eliminate marital rape, claims
such as the one in C.R. v. United Kingdom cannot be brought. 26 7 A
man always knows where he stands (or at least has the ability to find
out).
Finally, the legislative approach does not depend on prosecution
of marital rape cases. Problems such as prosecutorial opposition and
victim reluctance do not prevent the passage of legislation.2 68 A
legislature is free to eliminate marital exemption even though very
few, if any, cases involving marital rape are prosecuted. 269 This lack
of dependence on prosecution can be particularly powerful in
countries where marital exemption has a long history and victim
reluctance is high. In fact, Canada faced exactly this situation.
2 70
Canadian courts had no opportunity to hear cases of marital rape,

263.
Id. See generally C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 56
(1995).
264.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, vol. 3, 33-259 (Eng.).
265.
Andrew Evans, Peers Decide Rape in Marriage is a Crime, PRESS
ASSOCIATION, June 14, 1994, at Parliamentary News, available at LEXIS, News
Library, UK News Stories File (internal quotation marks omitted).
266.
It is possible to pass legislation that applies retrospectively, but this is rare
and was not the case in England.
267.
335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 56 (1995).
268.
See discussion supra note 257 and accompanying text.
269.
See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.a.
270.
Supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
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yet Parliament responded to startling statistics and the voices of
271
interest groups.
This independence from prosecution allows a legislature to guide
society in the direction it thinks society should be moving, as
illustrated by Canada during the nineties. 272 When Canada passed
its legislation removing marital immunity, one Member of Parliament
stated, "I believe this piece of legislation will mark a new beginning
in the way society views coercive sexual acts." 273 It was not long
afterward that society did follow Parliament's example and provinces
274
began establishing their own domestic violence programs.
2. Disadvantages: Legislative Delay and Abstract Review
Just as the judicial method has its weaknesses, so does the
legislative method. The first big hurdle in employing the legislative
method is just getting the legislature to realize that marital rape is a
problem. Legislatures do not benefit, as judiciaries do, from regular
presentation of cases and controversies; they rely on others to bring
issues to their attention. In Canada, for instance, Parliament did not
275
have cases to draw its attention to the issue of marital rape.
Rather, it took notice of increasing feminist literature and low
conviction rates.2 76 The change was largely due to the efforts of
individual women and groups of women across Canada. 2 77 Starting
the clock running at commencement of aggressive efforts by activists,
it took twelve years for Canadian Parliament to pass necessary
2 78
legislation.
In England, where cases "were" in fact being brought to the
attention of the courts, it took over forty years for Parliament to
recognize the problem of marital rape. 2 79 The first case that chipped
away at marital exemption took place in 1949.280 Yet the first
response from the legislature did not come until 1990 when the
28
English Law Commission began its paper, Rape within Marriage. '
Even after the judiciary had abolished marital immunity, the

271.
Snider, supra note 29, at 339.
272.
See discussion supra Part IIb. There is no guarantee, however, that
society will follow the lead of its legislature. Victims of marital rape may still refuse to
come forward even after legislation has been passed. See supra text accompanying
notes 221-24, 224-27.
273.
MacDonald, supra note 208, at 181.
274.
See supra text accompanying notes 211-14, 219-23.
275.
See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
276.
See supra text accompanying notes 180-87.
277.
Against Spousal Assault, supra note 211, at 101.
278.
See supra Part III.A.
279.
See discussion supra Part II.a.
280.
R. v. Clarke, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448 (Assizes 1949).
281.
See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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legislature still lagged behind by three years. 28 2 By the time marital
rape was criminalized in England, it was already illegal in Scotland,
eighteen American states, three Australian states, New Zealand,
Canada, Israel, France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Soviet
Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. 28 3 Hopefully, as more and more
countries criminalize marital rape, legislatures will have increased
awareness and will respond more quickly. 284
Even where a legislature is aware of the problem, the next
hurdle is convincing the legislature that complete elimination of
marital immunity is the correct solution. When Canada's Parliament
first set up the Law Reform Commission in 1971 to review the
criminal code, removing marital immunity was not the first
response. 28 5 Parliament reviewed hundreds of submissions, listened
to dozens of advocacy groups, and drafted forty-two pages of
amendments before Bill C-127 was adopted and marital immunity
28 6
was abolished.
The process of determining the correct legislative response to
marital rape is done in the abstract. Unless individuals come forth to
tell their stories, members of the legislature are left to their own
devices to fully understand the problem of marital rape. Without
victims coming forward to share their views, it is more likely that
legislators will fail to realize all of the dynamics of the problem. One
can appreciate how this may make their job more difficult and may
slow the process of criminalizing marital rape.

V.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES AS A TOOL FOR
CRIMINALIZING MARITAL RAPE

Because the judicial method excels in guiding the process leading
up to the change and the legislative method excels in gaining
legitimacy, a method that combines the strengths of both is desirable.
An improved approach would provide for timely recognition of a
change in societal morals, consideration of a wide variety of
arguments, and review of real instances of marital rape. The method
should not, however, compromise legitimacy. Taking all of these
characteristics into consideration, a better method for advocates
seeking to criminalize marital rape is to argue that it violates equal
protection provisions. Equal protection provisions can be found in

282.
See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
283.
Francis Gibb, Lords Say Rape is Rape in or out of Marriage, TIMES
(London), Oct. 24, 1991, availableat 1991 LEXIS, News Library, UK News Stories File.
284.
At least thirty-nine countries now consider marital rape a criminal offense.
Is Marital Rape a Crime?, supra note 27.
285.
See Supra text accompanying notes 179-87.
286.
See Supra text accompanying notes 192-98.
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state constitutions and international treaties alike. The validity of
state constitutions can hardly be questioned, but the authority of
international treaties is a more controversial issue. Equal protection
arguments made, however, are the same whether the provision
appears in a state constitution or an international treaty to which a
particular state is a party. Due to their controversial nature, a brief
discussion follows on the influence of international treaties.
For decades, international treaties have been gaining influence
in the global community.
"'[H]uman rights is today the single,
paramount virtue to which vice pays homage, that governments today
do not feel free to preach what they may persist in practicing.' In
other words, international human rights law is real, effective, and an
obligatory regime of global civilization today." 28 7 Today there are
dozens of international bodies, treaties, and non-governmental
organizations shaping international law. The European Court of
Human Rights, for one, has achieved unimagined success. 2 88 Latin
America has seen a shift toward the use of international judicial
processes for individual violations of human rights. 28 9 Even the
United States, which has resisted ratifying most human rights
treaties, has seen its Supreme Court recently use international law in
its decisions. 2 90 International law has become a more useful tool than
ever before.
All equal protection provisions provide essentially the same
protection and even use similar phrasing. 291 For instance, the

287.
Makau Matua, Book Review, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 255, 255 (2001) (quoting
HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, at ix-x (1990)). Contra J. SHAND WATSON,
THEORY AND REALITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1991).
288.
See Richard S. Kay, Human Rights in Theory and Practice: A Time of
Change and Development in Central and Eastern Europe: The European Convention on
Human Rights and the Authority of Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 217, 217 (1993); Rene
Provost, Book Note, 47 McGILL L.J. 693, 696 (2002).
289.
See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights Law in
Practice: The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights
Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
290.
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (acknowledging "the
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty").
291.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] art.
26, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("All persons are equal before the law and
are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the law."); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("All are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."); Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 24, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 ("All persons are equal before the law."); African
[Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 3(2), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
("Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law."). In addition to
international treaties, most countries also have similar provisions in their
constitutions.
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
292
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Unlike
other
non-discrimination
provisions
found
among
constitutions and treaties, 293 equal protection provisions serve as an
autonomous right.2 94
If legislation that is illegitimately
discriminatory is adopted by a state that has either an equal
protection provision in its constitution or is party to a human rights
295
treaty, it is in violation of those equal protection provisions.
For a particular discriminatory practice to be found in violation
of an equal protection provision, one must be able to show that it
qualifies as one of the enumerated characteristics of the provision, if
they are listed. Under the ICCPR, this would mean that it must
discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, etc. 296 According to
international doctrine, if the practice does not discriminate on the
basis of one of these enumerated characteristics, one must show that
the differentiation of treatment is not reasonable or objective and is
not for the purpose of obtaining a legitimate goal.29 7 Because marital
immunity does not fall in one of the enumerated categories, it must
meet this higher standard. Such an argument has been made under
the U.S. Constitution and was successful in eliminating spousal
immunity in New York.2 98 The case, People v. Liberta, is useful as a
model for elimination of marital immunity under similar equal
protection provisions.
Under the standard commonly applied to equal protection
provisions, the first step to proving violation of an equal protection
provision is to show that the treatment is differential. 299 In the case
of marital rape, marital exemption doctrine classifies unmarried rape
perpetrators differently from married rape perpetrators. A man who
rapes his wife is not guilty of rape, while an unmarried man who
commits the same act is guilty. In People v. Liberta, the husband
would have been protected by marital immunity but for an exception

292.
293.

ICCPR, supra note 291, art. 26.
See, e.g., id. arts. 2(1), 3, 4(1), 14(1), 20, 23-26.

294.
ALEX CONTE, ET AL., DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 162-65 (2004).

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 162.
ICCPR, supra note 291, art. 26.
See, e.g., id. at 174; People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984).
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 567.
CONTE, ET AL., supra note 294, at 172-73.
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to the immunity for separation.3 0 0 He was, in fact, still married, but
he and his wife had recently separated. In this situation, one day a
man may rape his wife without fear of criminal charges, but the next
he may be convicted for the same act. The differential treatment is
not difficult to argue.
The remaining question is whether this differential treatment is
3 01
reasonable and objective and in furtherance of a legitimate goal.
As discussed earlier, there are several arguments of how marital
exemption furthers legitimate goals. 30 2 One by one, each must be
shown to be unreasonable and not in furtherance of a legitimate goal.
Traditional justifications can be quickly dismissed. It is no longer
acceptable to argue that with marriage comes an irrevocable consent
to sexual intercourse or that a woman is the property of her husband.
These arguments have been rejected time and again and are no
30 3
longer recognized as reasonable claims.
With the fall of the traditional arguments, more modern
arguments have been made.
Liberta provides several such
arguments. The first argues that permitting criminal charges against
a man who rapes his wife requires impermissible government
30 4
intrusion in the privacy of marriage and hinders reconciliation.
This argument seems to put forth a legitimate goal, as marital
privacy and marital reconciliation are worthy goals for a state to
promote. Marital immunity is not, however, a reasonable means for
obtaining these goals. First, it is unthinkable to extend marital
privacy to nonconsensual acts. 30 5 "Just as a husband cannot invoke a
right of marital privacy to escape liability for beating his wife, he
cannot justifiably rape his wife under the guise of a right to
privacy. '' 30 6 Marital reconciliation is also an unlikely benefit of
marital immunity. If a woman is ready to press criminal charges
against her husband, the marriage has already passed a stage of

300.
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 571.
301.
CONTE, ET AL., supranote 294, at 174.
302.
See supra Part I.
303.
See, e.g., Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573-74; Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 77778 (Wyo. 1987) (referring to these theories as "legal fiction"); Merton v. State, 500 So.2d
1301, 1303 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (adopting Liberta decision); State v. Smith, 401
So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("the fact of marriage carries with it no
implied consent to sexual battery"); R. v. L., 103 A.L.R. 577 (Austl. 1991) (LEXIS, Legal
(excluding US), Australia, Case Law) ("No person shall, by reason only of the fact that
he is married to some other person, be presumed to have consented to sexual
intercourse with that other person."); S. v. H.M. Advocate, 1989 S.C.C.R. 248 (H.C.J.)
(LEXIS, Legal (excluding US), Scotland, Case Law) (Scottish court finding "any
supposed implied consent to intercourse is not irrevocable").
304.
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
305.
See, e.g., id.
306.
Id.
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reconciliation. 30 7 Pressing charges can hardly be blamed for the
dissolution of the marriage.
Another allegedly legitimate interest of marital immunity is the
prevention of fabricated accusations of rape. 30 8 The concern of
fabricated claims is heightened because marital rape is a difficult
crime to prove.
But difficulty of proof has never prevented
codification of criminal behavior before and there is no reason for it
now. One must assume that a criminal justice system can handle
false claims. 30 9 Furthermore, it can hardly be the case that marital
rape is the only claim that is prone to being fabricated. Surely,
claims of theft and arson for insurance purposes are at least as
susceptible to fraudulent claims.
The final argument claims that marital rape is not as serious an
offense as nonmarital rape and can be handled under assault
statutes. 310 This may be one of the stronger arguments, for it is
reasonable for criminal charges to align with the severity of the
crime. But criminal codes already recognize that rape is a more
serious violation than assault. 311 If rape were no more severe than
assault, criminal codes would not define rape as a distinct crime with
generally longer sentences.
Furthermore, there is no reason to
believe that a wife who is raped by her husband is harmed any less
than a woman raped by a stranger. Some jurisdictions actually
support the contrary-that being raped by one's spouse is worse than
being raped by a stranger because the offending spouse was in a
position of trust. 312 Recall that the Canadian Parliament amended
its Criminal Code, making the offender's position of trust in relation
to the victim, such as a spousal relationship, an aggravating
313
circumstance.
Once each argument alleging reasonableness and furtherance of
a legitimate goal is discredited, a court is left with a statute that
treats similarly situated people differently and that is not in
furtherance of a legitimate state interest. 3 14 After this analysis, a
court should declare the statute (or doctrine if it has been created
through common law) as either unconstitutional or in violation of
international treaty. It is a court's responsibility to declare when a
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311.
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See, e.g., Bala, supra note 215 (describing how an amendment to Canada's
Criminal Code advocated for the offender's status of being in a position of trust in
relation to the victim, such as in a spousal relationship, to be an aggravating
circumstance).
313.
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314.
See CONTE, ET AL., supra note 294, at 172-74 (discussing the standards that
a statute must meet to satisfy equal protection).
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statute has fallen contrary with the principles set forth in a state's
constitution. 3 15 Failing to declare the discriminatory statute a
violation of state law, international law, or both would attack the
credibility of those instruments.
Under this proposed approach, timeliness, thorough review, and
legitimacy are all achieved. By utilizing provisions that are already
in place, criminalization of marital rape will not be slowed by undue
legislative delay. And because a provision already does exist, courts
can review marital rape cases and chip away at spousal immunity
with less hesitancy.
Equal protection provisions require
interpretation-some more than others. Once a state ratifies an
international treaty with an equal protection provision or codifies one
of its own, a court will be tasked to interpret the provision. 316 "There
will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for
adaptation to changing circumstances. '3 17 Each time marital rape is
alleged to be a violation of equal protection, courts are forced to
interpret the meaning of the equal protection provision. As more
cases are brought, more circumstances will be considered. It is here
that this proposed solution will harness the adaptive nature of the
pure judicial approach. It is impossible for the representatives of a
state to have thought of every application of the equal protection
provision when it was ratified. And of those applications considered,
it is unlikely that marital rape was one of them. The process of
having cases heard by the judiciary will permit application of the
equal protection provision to marital rape where it might not
otherwise have been considered.
Legitimacy of this process is heightened as compared to the pure
judicial approach of England because the state has already expressed
its interest in equal protection.
In the case of England,
criminalization of marital rape did not rest upon the doctrine of equal
protection, but on a change in societal values. 3 18 In a sense, the
English court was merely updating the common law on marital rape.
Conversely, under the proposed approach a state's legislature has
already adopted an equal protection provision. Adoption of an equal
protection provision indicates the state's interest in guiding its policy
toward equality. This is the key characteristic of the equal protection
approach. By interpreting an existing provision, a judiciary's
criminalization of marital rape is less likely to be viewed as judicial

315.
See, e.g., Jones v. Scully, 71 A.L.D. 567 (Austl. 2002) (discussing whether a
provision was unconstitutional); Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor, [1998] 1 SLR
943 (Singapore High Court 1998) (same); Elf Enterprises (Caledonia) Ltd v. London
Bridge Engineering, Ltd., (Scotland, Court of Session: Outer House (1997) Outer House
Cases) (same).
316. See, e.g., C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 56, 69 (1995).
317. Id.
318. R. v. R.[1], [1991] 1 All E.R. 747, 754 (Crown Court 1990).
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lawmaking and is more likely to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of
the citizenry.
The obvious downside to this approach is that the state must
have an equal protection provision in place. Additionally, wives must
press charges against their husbands. If women are not pressing
charges for marital rape, courts will not be given the opportunity to
interpret equal protection provisions in the context of marital rape.
The proposed approach will not work in either of these situations.
Advocates of criminalizing marital rape that face either of these
dilemmas must employ the methods used in England and Canada.
Critics of the equal protection approach may argue that
retrospective application is still a problem. While this is true, claims
of inappropriate retrospective application are less likely to be
successful because once a state has chosen to adopt an equal
protection provision, citizens are on notice that laws will (or should)
soon be updated for compliance. Recall that the European Court of
Human Rights rejected a claim of retrospective application in
England. 319 Also recall that the abolition of spousal immunity in
England did not rest upon any existing provision. If a retrospectivity
claim failed under the circumstances in England, such a claim is
almost certainly doomed where criminalization of marital rape rests
on an existing provision.

VI. CONCLUSION

Until relatively recently, husbands around the globe have been
permitted to rape their wives. But changes in the notion of equality
and widespread feminist movements have led to the realization that
rape is still rape, whether or not the parties are married. 320 One by
one, countries have begun correcting the injustice of marital
immunity, subjecting husbands to the same standards as unmarried
men. 32 1 In the majority of countries, judiciaries were responsible for
3 22
the change, but in some countries, the legislature took the lead.
When the judiciary takes the helm, concerns of legitimacy and
retrospective application taint the outcome.
But concerns of
timeliness and thorough consideration also make legislative action
unappealing. While both of these approaches have accomplished the
desired goal, a better approach focuses on marital immunity as a
violation of equal protection. Such an approach will maximize the
strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both the pure judicial and
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See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gibb, supra note 132.
See supra notes 27, 283 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28, 29 and accompanying text.
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legislative models. The time has come to criminalize marital rape
throughout the world, and the tools to do so are available now more
than ever.
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